Cram Sheet · Concept Review
Concept review compiled from study session topics. Exam date: July 31, 2026 · Category-based concept review.
The fastest way to tell these apart: ask “who decides?”
| Model | Who decides | Memory hook |
|---|---|---|
| DAC | The resource owner | “Do it yourself” — you own the file, you set permissions (e.g. sharing a Google Doc) |
| MAC | The system/policy, via labels | “Military Mandates” — classification levels (Top Secret/Secret), centrally set, users can't override |
| RBAC | Your job role | “Role = Responsibility” — job title determines access, period |
| ABAC | Multiple attributes combined | “All conditions Add up” — role AND time AND location AND device evaluated together |
Rigid→flexible spectrum: MAC (most rigid) → RBAC (fixed by title) → DAC (owner discretion) → ABAC (most granular/context-aware). ABAC is the model behind ZTNA-style verification.
WPS lets devices connect via an 8-digit PIN instead of a full WPA2 passphrase. The 8th digit is just a checksum, and the router validates the PIN in two separate halves (first 4 digits, then last 3), telling the attacker whether each half was correct.
Once the PIN is cracked, the attacker recovers the actual WPA/WPA2 passphrase, regardless of its strength. Mitigation: disable WPS entirely.
A system should only run the services, protocols, applications, and ports it actually needs — everything else gets disabled or removed. Fewer running things = smaller attack surface.
Corrupts DNS resolution so a device resolves a domain to the wrong IP. Impact scope depends on where the poisoning happens:
| Method | How | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Host file modification | Attacker edits the local hosts file on one device (needs local access) | Single user |
| On-path interception | Attacker sits mid-conversation, spoofs the reply in real time | Single user/session |
| DNS server compromise | Attacker modifies records on the DNS server itself | Multiple users / org-wide |
Attacker takes control of a domain's registration (e.g. compromises the registrar account) and repoints the domain itself. Impact is broad — everyone who visits that domain, since the redirection happens at the authoritative source.
Redirects users to a fraudulent site without any user action — no bad link, no mistyped URL. The user types the correct address and still lands on the attacker's site, because the DNS resolution itself was corrupted (host file or server-level poisoning used for fraud).
| Attack | Primary goal / mechanism |
|---|---|
| SQL injection | Malicious input manipulates a SQL query to read, modify, or exfiltrate database contents. |
| Cross-site scripting (XSS) | Attacker-controlled script is embedded in a trusted page and executes in the victim's browser (steals cookies, performs actions). |
| Directory traversal | Uses sequences like ../ to escape the intended web root and read arbitrary server files. |
| Clickjacking | Transparent overlay tricks the user into clicking a hidden UI element, capturing the click for the attacker. |
| SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) | Attacker tricks the server into making requests it shouldn't (e.g. to internal-only resources), using the server's own trust/network access. |
| CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) | Attacker tricks a logged-in user's browser into submitting a request using the user's existing session/cookies. |
Malware that gives an attacker unauthorized remote control over a compromised system via a command-and-control (C2) channel. Capabilities scale with the malware's sophistication and the compromised account's privilege level:
CVSS Base Score = Exploitability subscore + Impact subscore
| Metric | What it measures |
|---|---|
| Base score | Overall severity — combines exploitability and impact. Too broad to answer “how easy,” specifically. |
| Exploitability subscore — Attack Vector (AV) — Attack Complexity (AC) — Privileges Required (PR) — User Interaction (UI) | How easily the vulnerability can be exploited overall, built from Attack Vector (how close the attacker needs to be: Network/Adjacent/Local/Physical), Attack Complexity (whether special preconditions must exist), Privileges Required (what access level the attacker needs beforehand), and User Interaction (whether a victim needs to take an action). |
| Impact subscore | Consequences to Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability if exploited — not ease of exploitation. |
| Temporal score | Adjusts severity over time (exploit code maturity, patch/remediation availability). |
| Tool | Interface | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Tcpdump | Command-line | Lightweight packet capture/analysis built for Linux/Unix. Fits hardened, no-GUI, minimal-footprint servers (ties to Least Functionality). |
| Wireshark (formerly “Ethereal”) | GUI | Full-featured packet analyzer; doesn't fit a “no GUI” requirement. |
| Sniffer / Network General | GUI | Legacy commercial protocol analyzer product/vendor name; also GUI-based. |
Compiled from study session concepts · SY0-701 · Exam date: July 31, 2026